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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
T HE decisions handed down in the past year by the supreme
courts of the states in the Southwest which dealt with some
phase of Constitutional Law were notable only for the number
thereof. Only three or four cases, out of a number somewhat over
forty, have any real significance, or make any real contribution to
this field. Perhaps ten of this forty have some passing interest.
The more important cases interpreted the United States Con-
stitution. Only a few cases had to deal solely with the constitu-
tions of the various states.
LABOR RELATIONS
The Texas Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Texas
statute requiring union organizers to register with the Secretary
of State, and to carry a card showing such registration, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. Article 5154 (a) (Vernon, 1950), against objections
that it interfered with freedom of speech.' The appellant had
been soliciting persons to join the labor union he represented, with-
out having complied with the registration requirements. The Texas
court based its decision upon Thomas v. Collins,' wherein the
United States Supreme Court, in considering the same statute here
in question, held that the statute could not be used in a manner
which would cause a previous restraint to be placed upon the free-
dom of speech. In that case, the conviction of a union official for
violation of an injunction ordering him not to make a public
speech without first registering was reversed. The United States
court said, "the state may regulate labor unions with a view to
protecting the public interest, but such regulation must not tres-
pass upon the domains set apart for freedom of speech." ' The
court, while recognizing that there are certain activities closely
related to free speech which may be regulated in order to protect
the public from fraud, refused to draw a line between those activi-
ties, and those which may not be regulated because they are pro-
1 Coutlikis v. State, .. Tex. Cr. R 268 S.W. 2d 192 (1954).
2323 U.S. 516 (1945).
3 Ibid., p. 532.
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tected by the First Amendment. The court simply said that an
attempt to prevent the making of a public speech went too far and
transgressed upon the protected liberties. It expressly declined to
decide whether the mere solicitation of members, apart from the
making of a public speech, was within this protected domain,
and since that time has never yet seen fit to draw this line.
The Texas court in the present case, has seemingly construed
the silence of the court upon this point, and some dicta in the
Thomas case, supra, sustaining regulation of solicitation for
funds,.to mean that solicitation for members alone may be regu-
lated by the state. This is the second Texas decision so holding.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reached the same conclusion
in an earlier case.
4
Prohibition of solicitation for money, unless the solicitor first
registers, has been upheld as a valid exercise of the states' police
power to prevent the perpetration of fraud upon the public.' It
may be that a solicitation for members of a labor union could be
regulated on a similar basis. There is, however, a very fine line
between activities which may be regulated in the public interest,
and those which may not be interfered with because of the neces-
sity of preserving certain fundamental freedoms. There is a con-
flict between cases on this subject - some holding that the activity
of solicitation for members may be regulated, and others holding
that it may not. For example, a California court construed the
Thomas decision to mean that the state could not prevent solicita-
tion of even one person. They seemed to think that the principle
of the Thomas case, which would not allow interference when an
organizer was soliciting membership from 300 persons, would
apply equally as well when there was only one person involved.'
If this case should come before the United States Supreme
Court, the conflict may finally be resolved, and an answer given
to this difficult problem.
4 American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S.W. 2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
5 "Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which amounts
to more than the right of free speech comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection
of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration
or identification requirement may be imposed." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540
(1945).
6 In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 102, 168 P. 2d 706 (1946).
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In another decision concerning labor relations, the Arkansas
Supreme Court joined the growing number of courts which have
held that the right to picket is not identical with the right of free
speech, and held that an injunction could be issued to restrain
unlawful picketing,7 even though the picketing was peaceful.' This
is in accord with a number of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions.9
RACE DISCRIMINATION
In the only racial discrimination question to come before the
highest state courts in the past year, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the fact that no Negro had ever been appointed
county jury commissioner was not enough to show any injury to
the accused." It said that any discrimination in the selection of
jury commissioners must have found its way into the work of
the jury commissioner in selecting the lists of grand and petit
jurors before the accused could show any injury or complain.
As the law now stands, it is not even necessary for a Negro to
be on the jury when another Negro is on trial.' The requirement
is that there must be no discrimination in the selection of jurors.
If the method used for selection is fair and impartial, and there
is no systematic exclusion, the requirements of due process of
law are met.12
TRIAL PROCEDURE
The Louisiana Supreme Court construed the doctrine of Powell
v. Alabama" to necessitate appointment of separate counsel for
each defendant, in a capital case, when there were two or more
defendants whose interests did not coincide. 4
7 The only real problem in regard to this type of case seems to be in determining
what is, and what is not unlawful. Generally, if there is a state statute declaring an
activity unlawful, then there is no question. Of course, if there is no statute, then the
determination of the unlawfulness is left to the courts.
sSheet Metal Workers v. Daniels, .... Ark.. ,264 S.W. 2d 597 (1954).
9 Hughes v. Superior Ct. of State of Calif. in and for Contra Costa County, 339 U.S.
460 (1949); Intern. Broth. of Teamsters Union, Local No. 309 v. Hawke, 339 U.S.
470 (1949) ; Senn v. Tilelayers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1936).
10 McNair v. State, __.__-Tex....., 265 S.W. 2d 105 (1954).
11 Baker v. State, 150 Ga. 446, 7 So. 2d 792 (1942).
12 Akins v. State of Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
1s 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14 State v. Brazile, ... La. , 75 So. 2d 856 (1954).
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The Criminal Court of Oklahoma decided that the constitutional
right to be confronted by witnesses is waived by a defendant's
conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of this right. The use
of a deposition by a defendant, when he had objected to the use
of the same deposition by the prosecution (because he had not
had a chance to cross-examine when the deposition was taken) was
said to be conduct inconsistent with this right, and hence was a
waiver thereof. 5
The New Mexico Supreme Court had occasion to consider
whether the results of a blood test were admissible in evidence,
when the blood bad been taken from the defendant while he was
unconscious. The defendant objected to the use of such evidence
on the ground that it was the equivalent of forcing him to testify
against himself. 6
The court distinguished between real and personal evidence,
and said that the freedom from self-incrimination applied only
when there was a use of personal evidence. The court thought that
the evidence in the present case was real evidence.
It has been held that the evidence obtained by a blood test is
not communication (i.e. personal evidence), but is real evidence
of the ultimate fact - the defendant's physical condition. 7 Like-
wise, the use of real evidence has been held not to violate the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, since this pro-
hibition extends only to cases of testimonial compulsion.1
There is another rule which applies in cases of this sort, regard-
less of the nature of the evidence. It was first laid down in the case
of Rochin v. California.sa Under this rule, evidence obtained in
a manner that is shocking and contrary to the settled principles
of the Anglo-American legal system is not admissible in a trial.
In such cases, use of the evidence thus obtained is said to violate
the due process clause. The court in the present case discussed
that rule, and decided that the situation in the present case (where
15 Miles v. State -..... Okl. Cr ------ 268 P. 2d 290 (1954).
16 Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N. Mex. 385, 271 P. 2d 827 (1954).
17 People v. Haeussler -..... Cal. 2d ... 260 P. 2d 8 (1953).
18 People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 112, 194 P. 2d 281 (1948).
Isa342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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the blood used in the test was taken with a hypodermic) did not
fall within that rule.
There have been many cases which have discussed the admis-
sibility of the results of blood tests, and though some have inferred
that the admission of the evidence might be unconstitutional if the
blood used in the test was procured without the consent of the de-
fendant, no case has ever unequivocally laid down that rule. On
the other hand, a prosecuting attorney has been allowed to testify
concerning the refusal of the defendant to submit to the test,'9 and,
in a slightly different case, the forcible taking of a breath sample
was held not to deprive a person of due process.2"
Although the defendant in the case at hand may have been
deprived of some right, it would seem that it was not so funda-
mental as to come within the protection of the due process clause.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Two cases arose last year in which the courts were called upon
to determine whether certain language in a statute was sufficiently
clear to inform the defendant of the charges against him. The
Louisiana court was presented with the problem of whether the
term "sexually indecent" was clear enough to form the basis of
a charge,21 and the Oklahoma Criminal Court had to decide the
sufficiency of the term "confidence game."2 Both courts held the
terms valid, saying that the term "confidence game" had a popular
meaning throughout the nation, and was well understood (although
the court conceded that if the defendant had asked for a clear
definition, it should have been given). It was held that the term
"sexually indecent" was well defined and that it had an accepted
meaning that was not susceptible to misunderstanding.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma was called upon to construe
its Mental Health Act22a for the first time, and upheld it against
objections that it deprived a person of liberty without due process
of law. The main objection was that the act did not provide for a
19 Gardner v. Commission, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E. 2d 614 (1954).
20 State v. Berg, .Ariz ..... 259 P. 2d 261 (1952).
21 State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So. 2d 392 (1954).
22 Lazar v. State, .__ Okl Cr ....... 275 P. 2d 1003 (1954).
22a 43A, O.S. Supp. § 60.
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hearing or notice to a party before such party was put under ob-
servation to determine whether he was insane.2" The court released
the petitioner, who had been committed for observation, deciding
that he had been deprived of liberty without due process, but up-
held the validity of the statute. The court said that the act inferen-
tially provided for a hearing and notice to defendants, and that
it was intended that such hearing be given. (Note - the statute
nowhere expressly provides for any such hearing.) It went on to
say that if a statute provided for a hearing either expressly or by
implication, the requirements of due process were met. There is
a long line of decisions which have held that "the essential ele-
ments of due process of law are notice and opportunity to be
heard, and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the
nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the
cause."24 The novelty of the case lies in the means used by the
court to sustain the law, and not in the rule of law it followed.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld an order of the Corpora-
tion Commission of that state which set a minimum price to be
obtained from the sale of gas taken from wells in that state, even
though portions of the gas found its way into interstate commerce.
It said that such a regulation did not unlawfully place an embargo
upon interstate commerce," or violate due process. The court said
that the Commission, under its power to preserve natural resources,
might fix a uniform price for the gas. The contention that such
a regulation in respect to sale of raw gas at the well-head does
not constitute a deprivation of property without due process was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Oklahoma.26 The price-fixing provision, insofar as it applied
to the sale of gas at the well-head was likewise upheld by the
United States court against objections that it placed a burden upon
interstate commerce in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and
23 In the matter of Lutker, _....Ok. Cr ---, 274 P. 2d 786 (1954).
24 Martin v. Sturbel, 367 Ill. 21, 10 N.E. 2d 325 (1937); McGowan v. McGowan,
324 Il1. App. 520, 58 N.E. 2d 338 (1944); Muskogee Iron Works v. Bason, ... Okl .... -
55 P. 2d 68 (1936).
25 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Corporation Commission ----- Okl -------- 272
P. 2d 425 (1954).
26 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
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Gas Co.26a Therein, the court stated that the congressional power
over interstate commerce was not exclusive, but that a state might
regulate matters of local concern over which federal authority
had not been exercised. The requirement is that the regulation
must not discriminate against or burden interstate commerce, that
the regulation safeguard some obvious state interest, and that the
local interest outweigh the national interest in preventing state
regulation. The court held that the interest of the state in protect-
ing its natural resources was a legitimate interest. The problem
posed by the present case, which takes the case out of the sphere
of the above-stated rules, is that the price fixed by the order herein
would apply to sales of all processed gas, and the residue after
processing, wherever they might occur, and not only to sales made
at the well-head. In so far as it does this, the state seems to have
exceeded its power, and is putting a burden on interstate com-
merce proper, and is taking property in violation of the due
process clause.
TAXATION
As long as a state uses a method that reasonably allocates to
that state the portion of business done there, a tax upon foreign
corporations or those engaged in interstate commerce is valid and
does not violate the due process clause. This test has been applied
by the United States Supreme Court as far back as 1924.27 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld a statute of the above-men-
tioned type,2" which provided that "for purposes of allocation,
all investments in, advances to, and revenues taken from a parent
corporation or subsidiary shall be allocated to Louisiana on the
basis of capital employed in Louisiana for corporation franchise
tax purposes by parent or the subsidiary corporation."29 The court
said that this was a method fairly calculated to assign to Louisiana
that portion of business reasonably attributable to that state, and
as such, it met the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
26a 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
27 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) ; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd.,
v. State Tax Comm., 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
28 Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. v. Fontenot, 225 La. 166, 72 So. 2d 465 (1954).
29 Wests LSA R.S. Sec. 47.606(B).
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FLUORIDATION
The question of the legality of the fluoridation of city water
supplies by the city health authority came up before the courts of
Oklahoma and Louisiana, and both courts reached the conclusion
that such an action was within the police power of the states
(which had been delegated to the cities.) 3" The main objection
in each case was that the city had made an unwarranted exercise
of the police power in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that the action was unreasonable and arbitrary. The courts over-
ruled these contentions, and said that the state, under its police
power, might take reasonable measures for the protection of the
public health. Fluoridation of the water supply was held to have
a real and substantive relation to the public health. It was said
that such an action was a matter of private health and hygiene,
but the court overruled this contention also. It is interesting to
note that one of the other lesser objections was that the action
abridged the freedom of religion. The court thought that this
objection meant that the cities' action was compulsory medication,
and overruled this contention. A California case a few years
earlier which dealt with the same problem posed in these two
cases was decided in the same way."
Fred R. Disheroon.
30 Dowell et al. v. City of Tulsa, ....Okl.-.-. 273 P. 2d 859 (1954) ; Chapman et al.
v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142 (1954).
-1' De Aryan v. Butler, .---- Cal. 2d .... , 260 P. 2d 98 (1953).
[Vol. 9
